Key takeaways
- Business email compromise drew 21,442 complaints and about $2.77 billion in reported losses to the FBI's IC3 in 2024[1].
- Small shops are exposed because one person often receives, approves and sends payments, sometimes from a phone in the field.
- Verify every bank or payment-method change by calling a number you already had, never a number in the email.
- If money has gone, call your bank to request a recall and file at ic3.gov the same day[2].
How the scam reaches a plumbing office
The FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) describes business email compromise (BEC) as a scam aimed at businesses that work with suppliers or regularly pay by wire transfer, carried out by compromising email accounts and other channels such as phone numbers and video meeting apps[1]. A plumbing contractor fits that profile closely. You pay supply houses, subcontractors and equipment lenders, you take deposits from homeowners and general contractors, and much of that runs through one shared office inbox.
The criminal does not need to break into your bank. They only need someone in your office to believe a request is genuine. In the trades the request usually arrives in one of five forms:
- Supplier bank change: an email that looks like it came from your supply house says their bank has changed and asks you to update remittance details before the next statement.
- Fake invoice: a realistic bill for materials, equipment rental or a permit service, sent to whoever pays the bills and often set just below the amount that would get a second look.
- Owner impersonation: a message in the owner's name asking the office to wire a deposit for a new commercial job today, with a line saying they are on a roof and cannot talk.
- General contractor diversion: on a commercial job, a spoofed GC email asks you to send lien waivers and banking details to a new address, or says your payment will now come from a different account.
- Payroll diversion: a technician's new direct-deposit form arrives by email the day before payroll.
What the complaint data shows
BEC is one of the costliest crimes reported to the FBI. In 2024 IC3 received 21,442 BEC complaints with reported losses of $2,770,151,146[1]. Complaint numbers have been almost flat for three years, at 21,832 in 2022 and 21,489 in 2023, while reported losses stayed between about $2.7 billion and $3.0 billion a year[1]. Phishing and spoofing, often the way a criminal gets into a mailbox in the first place, drew 193,407 complaints in 2024[1].
Source: FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), 2024[1]
Show the data
| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| 2022 | 2,742 million dollars |
| 2023 | 2,947 million dollars |
| 2024 | 2,770 million dollars |
These are only the cases people reported. An FBI public service announcement counted 305,033 BEC incidents worldwide and about $55.5 billion in exposed losses between October 2013 and December 2023, drawing on reports to IC3, police and banks[2]. The average loss per complaint is large because the scam targets real business payments, not small consumer purchases.
Why small contractors are easy targets
Most plumbing businesses are small. About 58% of plumbing, heating and air-conditioning contractor establishments had fewer than five employees in 2023[3], and about 63% of firms had annual receipts under $1 million in 2022[4]. In a shop that size, the person who opens supplier emails is often the same person who enters bank details and releases payments. There is no separate accounts payable team to notice that a remittance address changed.
Field work adds pressure. Owners approve payments from a truck or a crawl space, on a phone screen that hides the full sender address. Criminals time requests for Friday afternoons, month-end supplier runs and storm weeks, when the office is busy with emergency calls and wants to clear the queue quickly.
Red flags in a payment request
- Any change to bank details, remittance address or payment method, however routine it sounds.
- Urgency plus secrecy: pay today, do not call me, keep this between us.
- A sender address that is one character off the real domain, or a reply-to address that differs from the From line.
- An invoice that copies a real supplier's layout but shows a new phone number in the footer.
- A request to pay by a method you have never used with that vendor, such as gift cards, cryptocurrency or a personal account.
- A message that arrives when the real person is known to be away, for example on vacation or at a trade show.
The call-back rule and a payment-change procedure
One control stops most BEC losses: confirm any change to payment details through a second channel you already trust. The FBI advises using secondary channels or two-factor authentication to verify requests for changes in account information[2]. In a plumbing office that means a phone call to a number from your own vendor file, not the number printed in the email.
Freeze the request
Log the change request in the vendor file with the date, the sender and what changed. Do not touch the bank record yet.
Call a known number
Phone the vendor using the number on the original credit application, an invoice from before the change, or the supplier's public website. Ask for someone you have dealt with before.
Ask, do not tell
Do not read the new details out. Ask the vendor to describe the change and the reason. A real supplier will know; a criminal on a spoofed line will guess.
Get a second approval
A second person, usually the owner, approves the change in writing after reading the call notes.
Test and hold
For large vendors, confirm the first payment to the new account arrived before sending the next one.
Review monthly
At month-end close, list every bank detail change made in the month and check each has call notes attached.
Who verifies what
| Request | Verify by | Approver | Hold before paying |
|---|---|---|---|
| Supplier bank or remittance change | Call to the number in your vendor file | Owner | Until call notes are filed |
| New vendor setup | W-9 plus a call to the vendor's public number | Office manager and owner | First payment by check or a small test |
| Owner asks for an urgent wire | Call the owner's mobile and use an agreed code word | Owner, by voice | Only after voice confirmation |
| Technician direct-deposit change | Tech confirms in person or by phone | Payroll lead | One pay cycle if it arrived by email |
| GC or property manager asks for your banking details | Call their accounts payable on a known number | Office manager | Send through a secure portal, not email |
Mailbox settings that block many attempts
The procedure catches what gets through. These settings stop much of it reaching the person who pays the bills:
- Turn on multi-factor authentication for every email account, starting with the owner, office manager and bookkeeper.
- Use a unique password for each service and change shared passwords when someone leaves[2].
- Set email apps to show the full sender address, including on phones, so a lookalike domain is visible[2].
- Ask whoever manages your email to alert you when a new forwarding or inbox rule is created. Criminals inside a mailbox often hide the real vendor's replies.
- Never send login details or personal data by email, even to people you know[2].
Protecting the customers who pay you
BEC also works in reverse. Homeowners and property managers who owe you a deposit can receive a fake invoice in your name with new bank details. Print a short statement on every estimate and invoice: how you accept payment, that you will never change bank details by email, and the office number to call before paying. When a customer calls to check, treat it as a sign the process is working.
Those calls only help if someone answers. If Ava handles your overflow calls, add an approved answer about accepted payment methods to her knowledge base and have any question about bank changes passed to the office for a call back.
If a payment has already gone
Speed matters more than anything else. The FBI advises contacting your bank immediately to request a recall of the funds and filing a complaint at ic3.gov as soon as possible, whatever the amount[2]. The IC3 Recovery Asset Team works with banks to freeze money moved by fraud. In 2024 it handled 3,020 complaints involving $848.4 million in attempted theft, froze $469.1 million in domestic cases and reported a 66% success rate[1].
- Call your bank's fraud line with the amount, date, receiving account and wire reference, and ask for a recall.
- File at ic3.gov the same day, attaching the emails and transaction details.
- Reset passwords and check inbox rules on the account that received the fake request.
- Tell the real vendor or customer so they can check their own systems.
- Notify your insurer if you carry crime or cyber coverage, and keep every record.
Example: a supply-house bank change
Example: a six-truck shop receives an email that appears to come from its main supply house on the 28th of the month. It says the supplier has moved banks and attaches a letter on what looks like the supplier's letterhead. The office manager logs it, phones the branch using the number on the original credit application and asks the branch manager whether anything has changed. Nothing has. The email came from a domain with two letters swapped. The office manager forwards it to the owner, blocks the domain and notes the attempt in the vendor file. It takes about ten minutes. Without the call, the month's materials payment would have gone to the criminal's account.
Office rule: an email can start a payment change, but only a phone call to a number you already had can finish it.
Frequently asked questions
What is business email compromise?
A scam in which a criminal uses a hacked or spoofed email account, and sometimes a phone number or video call, to trick a business into sending money or sensitive information to the wrong place.
Will the bank give the money back?
Not always. Recovery depends on how fast you report and whether the funds are still in the receiving account. Call your bank's fraud line at once and file at ic3.gov.
Can we verify a request by replying to the email?
No. If the mailbox is compromised or spoofed, the reply goes to the criminal. Verify by phone using a number you already had on file.
Does cyber insurance cover this?
Ask your broker. Some policies cover social engineering losses only with a specific endorsement and only if you followed a verification procedure, so read the conditions before you need them.
References
FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2024). Federal Bureau of Investigation Internet Crime Report 2024 (opens in a new tab) โ
FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2024). Business Email Compromise: The $55 Billion Scam (public service announcement) (opens in a new tab) โ
U.S. Census Bureau (2023). County Business Patterns 2023, U.S. national file (cbp23us) (opens in a new tab) โ
U.S. Census Bureau (2022). Statistics of U.S. Businesses 2022: Firms by industry and enterprise receipts size (opens in a new tab) โ